Three parties, various campaign groups and a divided electorate leave Unionism fragmented. Compounded by Sinn Féin becoming the largest party in Stormont, and thus Michelle O’Neill claiming the title of First Minister; Unionists sense a political shift in Northern Ireland may be coming. Unionists are constantly theorising ‘how to save the Union’ but they operate on a flawed basis - focusing on the next election, a winning formula for voters or the battleground of ideas. This essay goes beyond the next election cycle to consider the long term future of Unionism in Northern Ireland. First, I will fully define Unionism, beyond immediate political conditions. Then, I will test the compatibility of this expanded definition against the current political reality. Once this is complete I will assert a way forward for Unionism in the current circumstances that best upholds our expanded definition.

At its base, Unionism is the belief that Northern Ireland is best served as a constituent part of the United Kingdom. However, if you speak to almost any Unionist voter, there is clearly something beyond that. Nobody fights for a constitutional arrangement. I would argue that, traditionally, Unionism is centred around three pillars. These pillars create the lens through which Unionists understand their identity and political survival: as an inseparable part of a culturally and institutionally robust Britain. These include a shared ethnocultural identity, strong political and institutional frameworks, and a guarantee of security and prosperity.

The first pillar of Unionism is a shared ethnocultural identity with the rest of the UK. Almost all Unionists identify as British (or Northern Irish) and are from the Protestant community. These people are an extension of the English and Scottish settlers of the Plantations during the Jacobin period. The history of this cultural identity is itself political. King James was the first King of both England and Scotland and the Plantations were an attempt to unify English and Scottish peoples under the shared project of consolidating Protestantism in Ireland. Consequently, when Ulster Unionists describe themselves as British, they are not referring to an interethnic political union (as in England, Scotland or Wales), but to a distinct ethnic identity that is explicitly tied to the Union of Scotland and England through the Crown. This creates a reflexive defence of the Union because Unionism is not merely a policy but a core component of Ulster's British ethnic identity.

In the current political landscape appeals to ethnicity are not fashionable. If you were to ask a Unionist politician to explain why they are a Unionist they would likely point to the second pillar: a strong political and institutional framework shared with the rest of the UK. This would often include the Monarchy, parliamentary sovereignty, the Welfare State, and the Armed Forces. There are two outcomes from institutionally invested Unionism. First, it allows Unionists to rationalise their ethnic impulse through political means or, to be more explicit, say something other than “I am a Unionist because I am British”. Second, it creates a yardstick which Unionists can use to combat Nationalist arguments for unification, for example, “the NHS is free but in RoI you have to pay for access to healthcare, therefore the Union is better”. I will discuss the merits and demerits of this approach later but it does root Unionism in materialist terms. This is not to say that the argument cannot be compelling. Let us not forget that Pax Britannica, the British golden age, was ushered in by Lord Castlereagh, born in Ulster, and the Duke of Wellington, a British statesman born in Leinster. Examples like this allow Unionists to fairly point to specific historical (and contemporary) instances and highlight the importance of Ulster within the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom’s importance to Ulster.

Despite this, the unpleasant reality for Unionists in Ulster is that they are a minority on the island of Ireland. Moreover, they are perceived to be a minority complicit in oppression and brutality by the “native” Irish population. Therefore the third pillar of Unionism is the guarantee of security for the Unionist population of Ulster and order in Northern Ireland. To explore each individual instance of community violence in Irish history is out of the scope of this essay, however, the Unionist community’s need for protection from Republican violence, Irish Nationalist politics, and Catholic dominance was a core reason for the partition of Ireland in the early 20th century. Throughout the history of Northern Ireland, Unionists have relied on the British Army and Security Services to act as a bulwark to prevent their destruction. This threat still exists in the mind of many Unionists to this day. In this context, Unionism, rather than conditional, becomes existential.

The three pillars show that Unionism is not just a political movement but an identitarian, institutional, and ultimately necessary framework for the existence of a people who have lived as a settler minority for over 400 years. Altogether this paints a much more coherent and multifaceted definition of Ulster Unionism.

Now that we have thoroughly defined Unionism, we are now able to systematically test the underlying assumptions (shared ethnocultural identity, political and institutional framework, and guarantee of security) which underpin it as a worldview. Namely, that Unionists would be in a union with a Britain that has a recognisable cultural, political, and moral character. What if that is no longer the case?

Identity

The first pillar of Ulster Unionism was a shared Protestant, British ethnocultural identity with the other constituent parts of the UK. We can see, categorically, that was the case as late as the 1960s. In the 1961 census; the UK was practically homogenous with 99% of the population identifying as white and 88% identifying as Christian (with a Catholic minority of around 4%). At this time, the Protestant Unionist community made up a supermajority of the population of Northern Ireland.

Over time, a few things have occurred which have changed the situation. First, the Unionist population has steadily decreased in Northern Ireland (1). The Protestant core of Unionists made up 65% of NI’s population in 1961, this decreased to 50.5% in 1991, and then again to just 40.5% (2)  in 2021. The more mixed the population of Northern Ireland, the more difficult it is for Westminster to take a preferential approach to Unionists within the democratic frame.

Second, the mainland has undergone a rapid secularisation, especially compared to Northern Ireland. In 2001, 72% of England and Wales identified as Christian, 65% of Scotland, and 86% of Northern Ireland. In 2021 this had decreased to 46% in England and Wales, 39% in Scotland, but, in Northern Ireland 80% still identify as Christian. Rapid secularisation has shattered the common moral, ethical and cultural ties that have bound the UK together, leaving Ulster Unionists adrift. This has had real consequences: for example, in 2019 Westminster overruled petitions of concern from the Unionist community to legalise both same-sex marriage and abortion - both of which are clearly contrary to Christian teaching - demonstrating that the secular liberal morality of the mainland is out of keeping with the traditional British Christian values still upheld by Ulster Unionists.

Third, over the last 70 years, the UK (particularly England) has changed as a result of      immigration. This change has accelerated since the turn of the millennium, with the White British population of England decreasing from 89.7% of the population in 2001 to       76.8% in 2021. In fact, the decline of the White British population is on course to accelerate as the UK has accepted, on average, approximately 500,000 immigrants (net) a year across the 2020s. This will culminate in England becoming minority British by 2063 which      has already happened in major metropolitan areas like London (36.8% White British), Birmingham (42.9%), and Manchester (48.7%). If one of the foundations for the Union is a shared ethnocultural identity, what happens when Ulster Unionists no longer recognise that identity in their fellow citizens? Will future British politicians of Indian, Pakistani or Nigerian descent feel the same bond with Northern Ireland their Scottish or English predecessors once did?

The combined effect of demographic decline, secularisation, and mass immigration has dissolved the very substance of Britishness to which Ulster Unionists pledged their loyalty. The religious, moral and ethnic unity that once underpinned the Union has been replaced by a secular, multicultural abstraction which the Unionist population cannot relate to. The erosion of the ties that once bound the nation together leaves Ulster Unionists feeling, to borrow Kipling’s phrase, “more British than the British themselves.”

Institutions and Politics

The second pillar of Unionism tied Northern Ireland to a strong political and institutional framework in the UK. Anchoring Unionism institutionally creates both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, it creates a national story of the United Kingdom that includes Ulster Unionists. This roots the people of Ulster within institutions which are greater than themselves. Unionists can look at something like the British Armed Forces, as an example, and point directly to family members or friends who disproportionately served and say, “I am proud the UK is my country”. The negative side is rooted in the same principle. Anchoring Unionism institutionally creates an inherently materialist paradigm, thus if the institutions decline or change, Nationalists can point towards potentially preferential circumstances in the Republic and fairly say, “You said Unionism was necessary for X reasons, which no longer exist. Therefore Unionism is no longer necessary.”

To illustrate this, one of the main arguments Unionists have used in this vein is that Northern Ireland is “better off” in the Union - pointing to the UK’s historic economic dominance. However, circumstances have changed and Nationalists can use this to their advantage. The Republic of Ireland’s economy is doing well: GDP grew by 3.4% in 2025 and GNI grew by 4.8%. By contrast, the UK’s GDP grew by 1.1% and GNI grew by 0.8%. Furthermore, Dublin’s public finances are in a much healthier position with a debt to GDP ratio of 40% compared to London's 98%. Moreover, Ireland has achieved success in attracting multinationals, developing a world-class R&D landscape, higher per-capita income metrics and a rising global reputation. It is worth noting that these economic gains are fragile. They are based on a large multinational presence and favourable tax/R&D policies, which are themselves a consequence of favourable international circumstances that could change at any moment. That said, Northern Ireland has the lowest productivity, second lowest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and second lowest median wages in the UK. It could therefore be credibly argued (under these terms) that Ulster would be “better off” as a big fish in a smaller, growing economy than the sickman of a waning global market.

Let us take another example: the Royal Family.  In section 1 we identified the importance of the Royal Family in the ethnogenesis of Ulster Unionists, thus, creating an extreme level of loyalty to the Crown. This tie was strengthened by the actions taken in Ireland by William of Orange during the Glorious Revolution, which secured Protestant dominance in Ireland (the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne is celebrated by Ulster Unionists to this day). Unfortunately for Unionists this relationship is now almost completely one-way. The Crown has been hollowed out to align with liberal cosmopolitan values. The Monarchy has been stripped of its constitutional powers like Royal Ascent or Ministerial appointments. As such, any Monarch would be unable to intervene in any constitutional changes or disputes related to Northern Ireland.      

These examples illustrate that far from being attached to a strong political and institutional framework, Unionists are now arguing for a political union that fails to serve their interests in a way it once did. This creates a challenge for Unionists, who, by anchoring Unionism in materialist terms, have to then defend increasingly difficult circumstances without a clear rebuttal.

Security Guarantees

The third pillar identified was the security guarantee that the Union provides the British population in Northern Ireland. There is a legitimate fear, rooted in history, that in any new constitutional settlement Unionists could suffer real political persecution and violence. However, Unionists should be reassured that the geopolitical and institutional realities of the 21st Century make this situation highly improbable - if not impossible.

There is a multilayered framework of international law which Unionists can use to guarantee their interests (and dissuades any Nationalist ‘misbehaviour’). The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) and its successors are lodged as international treaties and registered with the United Nations. They enshrine principles of parity of esteem, non-discrimination, and consent. These obligations would be integrated regardless of the constitutional settlement of Northern Ireland. Moreover, any violation of these principles (such as political exclusion, denial of equal citizenship, or failure to suppress paramilitary activities) would allow Ulster Unionists to invoke dispute mechanisms, appeal to the UN, or trigger bilateral enforcement clauses. To further bolster this; the Republic of Ireland, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland have constitutional commitments to the ECHR which provides direct judiciability and an additional layer of protection for the Unionist community. This allows any Unionist, who has been mistreated or discriminated against to take the state to an extrajudicial body. Breach of these obligations could result in international censure, economic sanctions or legal action; all of which would be disastrous for an open and globalised Ireland. Thus, the combination of domestic and international treaties creates dense layers of accountability that will protect Unionists regardless of constitutional settlement.

Beyond the Liberal international protections offered by law and institutions, there is a further, hard-power mitigation that would protect the Unionist population. Namely, that the Republic of Ireland is totally dependent on the UK for its own security. The Royal Air Force patrols Irish airspace; British naval and cyber assets monitor the Atlantic and Irish Sea; and UK-Irish intelligence cooperation underpins counterterrorism, organised-crime prevention, and cybersecurity. Ireland may be formally neutral but it is functionally enmeshed in British and NATO defence systems. Therefore, the Republic lacks the capacity to defend itself independently, a strategic vulnerability which functions as a guarantee for the Ulster Unionists. Dublin simply cannot behave in a way that provokes British hostility without exposing its own national weakness. This would, in fact, be reinforced by any changes to Northern Ireland’s constitutional arrangements. The Irish government simply does not have the resources to manage the complex security environment in Northern Ireland alone. It would therefore remain dependent on Britain for intelligence, policing and external defence. Should sectarian persecution or serious disorder arise, London retains ample means of both soft and hard coercion to guarantee protective arrangements for the Unionist community.

Altogether peace in Northern Ireland is upheld through a multi-layered framework of coercive legality and structural dependency. The Republic and Nationalist cannot act outside or threaten the British (and international) security order which binds it to protect Unionist citizens. Thus, the weakness of Irish strategic autonomy becomes the safeguard for Unionists, not just British strength. This will not change under any circumstances.

We have identified three pillars upon which Unionism has historically stood: a common ethnocultural identity; a strong, shared political and institutional framework; and a British guarantee of security for the Unionist community. Yet, each of the pillars are eroding. The British ethnocultural base is declining under demographic and ideological changes. British political, economic and international prestige is crumbling under the weight of managerialism. Finally, the security of the Unionist population has been subsumed by international law. The Britain that Unionists believe themselves to be “in Union” with has ceased to exist in any living sense. The tension between how Unionism is defined and the practical political realities of the Union are clear. Any Unionist synthesis will require a clear strategy and long term vision.

The source of this tension is that Ulster Unionism lacks a robust political formula. There is no vision for how Northern Ireland, or the United Kingdom, will look 20, 50, or even 100 years in the future. You can criticise Sinn Fein for many things but their political formula is clear: a 32-county socialist republic. Likewise, centrist Alliance types hold a similar vision: a progressive, diverse Northern Ireland where divisions of the past are forgotten. It doesn’t matter if these ideas are utopian or naive; they provide a positive, forward-thinking vision that guides political decision-making. This gives all oppositional politicians a metaphoric North Star to drive their agendas, regardless of the passage of time or political circumstances.

Unionists, in contrast, have spent years in reflexive obstinance. Many Unionists will say this either doesn’t matter or deny the reality. The flag, the monarch, and history are all proof that the Union still lives. On top of this, constant disunity among political actors has created a culture of bickering and defensive politics. There is no shared idea of what Unionism stands for in practice, only what it stands against. As such, Ulster Unionists are obsessed with navel gazing, electioneering and news cycles. Thus, creating contempt amongst their base. When coupled with the same social changes      facing Britain seeping into Northern Ireland, it is clear why Ulster Unionism seems in crisis.

Despite this, I see a very clear political formula which can offer hope for the Unionist cause. Unionism as a cultural ark for Britishness. This would see Northern Ireland as the custodians of British values, institutions and ethnocultural identity. The dissolution of Unionism’s historic pillars outlined in the Antithesis forces a reevaluation of what the Union means for a cultural substance which survives more wholly in Ulster than in Great Britain itself. The Union cannot be saved by appeals to Britain as it is but instead by preserving Britain as it was. By rooting Unionism in cultural preservation instead of following changing institutions on the mainland; Unionists can stabilise their own identity, reclaim ideological initiative and transform demographic vulnerability into purpose.

To be more explicit, the political framework of Unionism as a Cultural Ark protects and promotes a positive vision for the Union rooted in traditional values: implementing policy that empowers Unionism and protects British subjects - enmeshed within a Christian metaethic. By enshrining and promoting things such as the English language, British History, and the Protestant Reformation; Unionists can create a national purpose underpinned by tradition and civic duty.

Adopting this political framework will reverse the direction of dependence. A confident, culturally rooted Unionism produces a population that is less demoralised, less reactive, and less susceptible to Nationalist narratives of inevitable defeat. This would have the second order offering of an aspirational identity and moral framework that many disillusioned people in Great Britain currently lack. Thus bolstering external support for the Union and attracting likeminded families from other parts of the country. Strengthening the emotional and political case for the Union makes Northern Ireland an indispensable asset rather than a burden. This creates leverage, prestige and pressure which will make it harder to sever the Union in the future.

In practical terms, a political framework of Unionism as a Cultural Ark can transform Unionism from a defensive voting bloc into an organised political project with measurable consequences. It creates a rationale for building institutions like education curricula, cultural organisations, legal defence bodies, and media infrastructure which cease to be “nice-to-haves” and become strategic instruments for shaping public opinion and future constitutional outcomes. A Unionism that actively shapes the next generation will be more resilient politically because its strength will rest on long-term (i.e. intergenerational) cultural reproduction rather than being led by external forces. Furthermore, investment in cultural production, youth engagement, and diaspora networks will generate softpower that Unionists can wield to achieve influence in the other parts of the UK (and even abroad). Institutionally embedding British identity creates a structural argument for retaining the Union as any potential constitutional change would have to contend with deeply rooted cultural infrastructure. The stronger this infrastructure the more costly and destabilising it is to uproot. Therefore, adopting this political formula will make the maintenance of the Union the path of least resistance for future British or Irish governments.

Since 1997 Unionists have sought, almost exclusively, to preserve Ulster Unionist specific cultural and historical praxes. However, this has been an ineffective strategy that encourages an independent Northern Irish identity and politics that is reactive to the aims and actions of Nationalist propaganda. Unionists have given so much energy, time and blood to maintain a British identity, yet have spent almost all of their political capital othering themselves. The game is not about votes at Stormont, nor is about the battle of ideas - it is about securing the best future possible for the Unionist community. That means building institutional power to steer the system in Unionists’ favour. Therefore building the political conditions which allow Unionists to step over political squabbles and to make their reality seem inevitable. If Unionists are as British as they claim to be then the inheritance and legacy of William Shakespeare, Isaac Newton, Admiral Nelson, Robert Burns, or Winston Churchill are as much theirs to celebrate as they are any part of the United Kingdom’s.

Moreover from a realist perspective, we have already touched on the demographic destiny of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In 50 or 75 years, political calculus is unlikely to be in the favour of Unionists. By      protecting our shared and historic culture Ulster Unionists will have a greater sense of what a positive future will look like in changing constitutional circumstances. This is not the paper to discuss these terms specifically but suffice to say the stronger the cultural ties Unionists have to Britain (even historically) the more autonomy and legal exceptions Unionists can expect in any settlement.

By thoroughly defining Unionism and analysing Unionism against the situation as it is, we have exposed the disconnect between what Unionists believe to be true and the political reality. Diagnosing this explains the political shortcomings plaguing Unionist discourse. To combat this Ulster Unionists should adopt a new positive political formula. They     .      are uniquely positioned to act as a Cultural Ark for Britishness as many of the issues faced in mainland Britain are not present to the same extent in Unionist communities. Unionists are more proud of their country, they are more religious, and they are more ethnically British. By championing this cause we can be more assertive and influential both in Northern Ireland and in the United Kingdom. Continuing the status quo will result in Unionists losing politically as well as culturally.

The proposition of the synthesis, reorganising Unionism as a cultural ark for Britishness, must be backed up by practical solutions. Unionism must operationalise within the wider political and institutional landscape of Northern Ireland. This requires Unionists to construct the long-term cultural, legal, and strategic architecture necessary for their survival. What follows are policy proposals which emerge directly from the key message of the essay: that the Union only endures when its foundations are embodied and defended through institutions that are capable of shaping public sentiment and political outcomes.

1 - Mobilise Fundraising

Unionism has a large challenge mobilising and accessing funds. Donors need to be made aware that their contributions      will support essential, existential work. Currently there are few avenues for Unionists to mobilise funds and any activities that do receive money are not joined up and inconsistent in messaging. Funds should prioritise indirect hard influence over nebulous political spending.

2 - A Legal Challenge Body

Unionists should set up an independent body to fund legal action or provide representation for Unionists seeking to protect their heritage or human rights. The metapolitical structure we operate within is highly legalised. As such, bodies like the UK Supreme Court or ECHR can be used to protect Unionist interests. Unionists should not be shy to stand up for their rights in the courts. Creating a body that is unashamedly Unionist, that has recourse to funds, and has sharp legal minds will allow Unionists to rebuff discriminatory action and defend future political activities.

3 - Funding for Culture

Unionists must start to fund and support funding to support the arts. For years Nationalists have dominated the arts. Whether it is television, film, music or literature; the dominant narrative glorifies Nationalist sentiment. If you speak to any regular young person in the UK they are likely to have a positive view of Irish Nationalism. Derry Girls and Kneecap act as cultural capital. Unionists need to offer an alternative that actively promotes their position and dismantle the conditions which promote Nationalist cultural hegemony.

4 - Engaging Young People

Unionists need to offer opportunities for young people through cultural institutions such as scholarships, training or education. This is necessary for the next generation to be informed, engaged and ready to defend the Union.  Unionist organisations could offer grants for British people starting businesses in Unionist communities. Alternatively, they could offer young people grants or scholarships to study or train in useful fields. By doing this through third parties or charities, Unionists can avoid legal challenges through the Equality Act.

5 - An International Lobby

Unionists are comparatively awful at engaging and mobilising their diaspora compared to Nationalists. Unionists should aim to establish lobbying      organisations to engage with potential political allies in Britain, the US, Canada, Australia and Europe. These international allies could play a key role in mobilising additional funds, political capital and international pressure to defend Unionist interests. Every politician in the Anglo-Sphere should be aware of the struggle faced by Unionists today.

Ulster Unionism stands at the crossroads. This essay has revealed the contradiction at the heart of the modern Union: the Britain that once underwrote Unionists' identity no longer exists in the same form. The only coherent synthesis is a Unionism that ceases to be derivative of the mainland and instead becomes the custodian of its historic substance. If Unionists embrace this role, one rooted in culture, embodied in institutions, and expressed through long-term strategy, then the Union can endure. If they fail, future constitutional outcomes will be determined by actors who possess clarity of purpose where Unionists possess only sentiment. The survival of the Union therefore depends on whether Ulster can assume the role that Britain has abdicated: the defence of Britishness itself.Allegiance, one can say, requires the fulfilment of obligations but does not require subscription to any common purpose or what the critics of the Union usually call its ‘project’ (or lack of one). Margaret Canovan (1996) put it this way: the substance of Union is less the characteristics its citizens possess as individuals than the inheritance they commonly share. What allegiance captures is what she called the ‘shared ownership of something outside us’ and not (necessarily) the ‘similarities inside us.’ For all the celebration of the aspirant ‘civic’ form of contemporary nationalist thinking, it can be said that in the Union it has been there a long time already. Consequently, as the former Director of the Constitution Unit Robert Hazell suggested, confidence – not foolish optimism - should be one of the operative principles of the Union and by that he meant the UK rests on much broader and firmer foundations of allegiance than its critics assert.

1. The proxy used to measure this data over time is census data on religious identification.

2. Again, the proxy seems to work here as when asked for their national identity 32% of respondents identified as British and  8% identified as Northern Irish and British.